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RPSC Sub Inspector · Module 44 · standard depth · 17 min

Bank reforms: priority lending, capital rules, the 1991 reforms and the clean-up

What RPSC Sub Inspector asks from this chapter

Syllabus lines this chapter covers:

  • Paper II: General Knowledge and General Science · Basic economics: budgeting, banking, public finance, national income, growth; accounting in administration; stock market; fiscal and monetary policy; subsidies and PDS; e-commerce; inflation.
  • Paper II: General Knowledge and General Science · Five Year Plans; agriculture, industry, services and trade; economic problems and reforms; HDI, poverty and unemployment schemes; provisions for weaker sections.

RPSC Sub Inspector questions from this module are being sorted into our bank.

Cut to standard depth for RPSC Sub Inspector. 3 deeper paragraphs are in the full chapter.

Start from zero: why banks need a rulebook

Start with a village savings group. Imagine twenty families who pool their savings, and one member keeps the money and lends it out. That member decides who gets loans, how much cash to keep aside, and how to record who has repaid. If the member lends only to friends, keeps no cash, or hides loans that have gone bad, the families can lose everything.

Four questions every bank rulebook answers

A bank faces the same four questions. It must decide who gets credit, how much of its own money to keep as a cushion against losses, whether its books are honest about bad loans, and who watches it and how big it may grow. A bank holds the savings of millions of people, so a wrong answer to any of these hurts far more people than one village group.

This chapter follows India's answers. The country first told banks where some credit must go, through priority sector lending. It then set rules for capital, cleaned up how banks count income and bad loans after 1991, and later tackled a mountain of bad loans and reshaped the banks themselves. Each answer came at a particular time, to solve a particular problem, and each brought new problems of its own.

Why it matters. Banks are the main bridge between savings and investment in India. When the rules are right, savings reach farms, factories and homes safely. When they are wrong, bad loans pile up, credit dries up and taxpayers often pay to rescue the banks.

Priority sector lending: telling banks where some credit must go

Start with a simple choice. Suppose you run a bank and have ₹1 crore to lend. You could give it to one large company, or give ₹50,000 each to two hundred small farmers. The single big loan is cheaper to check and easier to collect, so a bank that only seeks profit will usually choose it.

Where priority sector lending goes

The result of that choice. If every bank thinks this way, farmers, tiny firms and poor households get very little formal credit, even when many of them would repay. They then turn to moneylenders who charge far higher interest. Economists call this a market failure in credit, because the market alone does not send money where it would do a lot of good.

What the rule says. The RBI's directions on priority sector lending (PSL) tell banks to give a fixed share of their credit to such sectors. For domestic commercial banks, the overall target is 40% of Adjusted Net Bank Credit (ANBC) or Credit Equivalent of Off-Balance Sheet Exposure (CEOBSE), whichever is higher. Within this 40%, 18% must go to agriculture and 12% to weaker sections.

What these terms mean. ANBC is, roughly, the bank's total lending after a few adjustments that the RBI lists. CEOBSE counts business that does not sit on the balance sheet. Taking whichever is higher stops a bank from shrinking its target by moving business off its books.

One ₹1 crore loan to a company or ₹50,000 each to 200 farmers: why profit-seeking banks skip small borrowers

Why it was introduced. PSL grows from the same idea as the nationalisation of 1969, which was that bank credit should follow national priorities and not only private profit. Nationalisation gave the government ownership of most bank lending, and PSL gave it a rule to steer that lending. This kind of policy is called directed credit.

Why it matters. PSL has kept credit flowing to farms, small firms and weaker sections that banks would otherwise ignore. The cost is that some of these loans are riskier and costlier to handle, and loans given only to meet a target can turn bad. A balanced answer says that PSL corrects a real market failure, but it works only when banks still judge each borrower carefully.

Capital adequacy: why a bank must keep its own money at risk

Start with a shopkeeper. Think of a shopkeeper who sells goods on credit to regular customers. If a few customers never pay, the shopkeeper covers the loss from their own savings and the shop stays open. A bank works the same way, and its own capital is that cushion: when loans go bad, capital takes the first hit so that depositors do not.

The Basel III capital stack in India

Not all loans are equally risky. A loan to the government is far safer than an unsecured loan to a new company. So the rules give each asset a risk weight, and the weighted total is called risk-weighted assets (RWAs). A bank's capital is then measured as a share of its RWAs, a ratio called the capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR).

Where the rules come from. The Basel rules are international standards for bank capital, named after the Swiss city where central banks meet to agree on them. The third set, Basel III, was drawn up after the global financial crisis of 2008 showed that many banks held too little capital of good quality. India applies these standards through the RBI's capital rules.

India's Basel III numbers. Banks must keep a minimum total capital of 9% of RWAs. Of this, Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), the purest capital made of shareholders' equity and reserves, must be at least 5.5%. On top of this, banks must keep a capital conservation buffer (CCB) of 2.5% in the form of CET1, which brings CET1 with the buffer to 8% and total capital with the buffer to 11.5%.

Why a buffer on top. The buffer is meant to be built up in good times and drawn down in bad times. A bank that falls into its buffer faces limits on paying out profits, for example as dividends, until it rebuilds capital. This pushes banks to keep extra strength before trouble comes rather than after.

Why it matters. More capital makes banks safer, but capital is costly, so a bank with thin capital has to slow its lending. This is why weak capital in banks can choke credit to the whole economy. It is also why the government, as owner, has at times had to put fresh capital into public sector banks.

The 1991 reforms: from controlled banks to competing banks

The problem in 1991. By 1991 a large part of every deposit was locked up by rules, because banks had to hold high reserves with the RBI and in government securities. Interest rates were set from above, and very few new banks could enter the market. Banks were safe from competition, but many were inefficient, and their accounts did not show bad loans clearly.

Before and after the 1991 reforms

The Narasimham Committee (1991). The Committee on the Financial System, chaired by M. Narasimham, reported in November 1991 and set the direction of reform, and the RBI says the banking reforms of the 1990s were guided mainly by its recommendations. Over that decade the SLR fell from 38.5% to 25% and the CRR from 15% to 4.5%, which freed money for lending. Interest rates were deregulated, and entry rules were eased so that new private sector banks could be licensed from 1993.

Cleaning up the books. The reforms also brought prudential norms on income recognition, asset classification and provisioning. In plain words, a bank could no longer count unpaid interest as income, had to label a loan as bad once payments stopped, and had to set money aside for likely losses. A capital ratio of 8% came in at the same time, and it was the forerunner of today's Basel III rules.

Why it matters. The 1991 reforms changed what a bank is for, from a channel for directed credit into a business that must earn, count and provision honestly. Lower reserve rules freed money for lending, and competition from new private banks pushed public sector banks to improve. The prudential norms are also why bad loans could later be measured at all, which made the clean-up of the 2010s possible.

The clean-up: recognising and resolving bad loans

The problem after 2010. During the boom years before 2010, banks lent heavily to large companies for steel, power, roads and other big projects. Many of these projects stalled, but banks often kept rolling over the loans instead of calling them bad. So the true size of the problem stayed hidden, and the banks kept lending as if nothing was wrong.

The clean-up in four steps

Step one: see the problem honestly. In 2015 the RBI began an Asset Quality Review (AQR), checking banks' books loan by loan. Many stressed loans that had been shown as healthy were reclassified as non-performing assets (NPAs), so bad loans on paper shot up. This was painful, but a problem that is hidden cannot be fixed.

The 4R strategy. The government described its response as 4R: Recognition of NPAs transparently, Resolution and recovery of value from stressed loans, Recapitalisation of public sector banks, and Reforms in banks and the wider financial system. Recapitalisation was large, because banks that recognise losses lose capital. Over the four years to 2018-19, public sector banks received ₹3.12 lakh crore of fresh capital, of which ₹2.46 lakh crore came from the government.

Tools to recover money. The SARFAESI Act lets secured lenders recover dues of more than ₹1 lakh by acting against the assets pledged for a loan, without going to court. A borrower who feels wronged can appeal to the Debts Recovery Tribunal. For large companies, the main tool since 2016 is the bankruptcy code, which the chapter on bad loans explains in full.

SARFAESI, IBC, PCA and NARCL: the clean-up toolkit

A watchman for weak banks. Under the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework, the RBI steps in early when a bank's health slips. The revised framework of 2 November 2021 watches three things: capital (CRAR and CET1), asset quality (net NPA ratio, where the first warning level is 6%) and leverage. A bank under PCA faces limits, for example on expansion, until it recovers.

A bank for bad loans. In September 2021 the Cabinet approved a government guarantee of up to ₹30,600 crore for security receipts issued by the National Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (NARCL). NARCL is meant to take over about ₹2 lakh crore of stressed loans in phases, paying banks 15% in cash and 85% in security receipts. The idea is that one buyer can take faster, single-point decisions on loans that many banks share.

Why it matters. The clean-up shows the order in which a banking crisis must be fixed: first recognise the losses, then recover what you can, then rebuild capital, then change the rules so it does not happen again. Each step has a cost, especially the taxpayer money used for recapitalisation and guarantees. A good Mains answer weighs that cost against the far bigger cost of banks that cannot lend.

Reshaping the banks: mergers and cooperative banks (2020)

Mega consolidation (2020). From 1 April 2020, ten public sector banks were merged into four. Oriental Bank of Commerce and United Bank of India joined Punjab National Bank, Syndicate Bank joined Canara Bank, Andhra Bank and Corporation Bank joined Union Bank of India, and Allahabad Bank joined Indian Bank. The government said the move would create banks with scale comparable to global banks, with cost benefits and better risk management.

Ten banks into four, 1 April 2020

Cooperative banks brought closer to the RBI (2020). Cooperative banks are also cooperative societies, so for a long time the RBI had fewer powers over how they were run than over commercial banks. The Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2020 gave the RBI additional powers over them in areas such as management, audit, capital, and reconstruction or amalgamation. For urban cooperative banks it applied from 26 June 2020.

Each reform answers a weakness and raises the next question

Why it matters. Each reform answers a weakness of the system before it. The Narasimham reforms tackled inefficiency and hidden bad loans, Basel norms tackle thin capital, mergers tackle small size, and the 2020 Act tackles weak oversight of cooperative banks. Each step also brings new questions, such as staff and branch cuts after mergers and the risk that very large banks become "too big to fail", so a good Mains answer traces the chain from problem to reform to the next problem.

Punjab National Bank's head office in New Delhi
Punjab National Bank's head office in New DelhiPhoto: Meet.arpit99, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Quick revision

Revision card: bank reforms from 1969 to 2021
  • Under priority sector lending, domestic commercial banks must lend 40% of ANBC or CEOBSE, whichever is higher, including 18% to agriculture and 12% to weaker sections.
  • Under RBI's Basel III rules, banks keep minimum total capital of 9% of risk-weighted assets, CET1 of at least 5.5%, and a 2.5% conservation buffer, which makes 11.5% in all.
  • The Narasimham Committee (1991) guided the 1990s reforms, which cut the SLR to 25% and the CRR to 4.5%, brought in prudential norms and an 8% capital ratio, freed interest rates and let in new private banks.
  • The RBI's Asset Quality Review began in 2015, and the government's 4R strategy covered recognition, resolution, recapitalisation and reforms.
  • The SARFAESI Act lets secured lenders recover dues above ₹1 lakh from pledged assets without going to court, and the revised PCA framework (2021) lets the RBI step in early when a bank weakens.
  • NARCL got a government guarantee of up to ₹30,600 crore in 2021 to buy stressed loans for 15% cash and 85% security receipts.
  • From 1 April 2020, ten public sector banks were merged into four, and the Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2020 gave the RBI more powers over cooperative banks.

Check yourself

Exam-style questions on this chapter. Pick an answer to see the explanation. 0 of 7 answered

  1. Consider the following statements about priority sector lending by domestic commercial banks: 1. The overall target is 40% of Adjusted Net Bank Credit or Credit Equivalent of Off-Balance Sheet Exposure, whichever is higher. 2. The 18% target for agriculture is in addition to the 40% overall target. Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  2. Under RBI's Basel III capital rules, what is the total capital a bank must hold, including the capital conservation buffer, as a share of risk-weighted assets?

  3. In the amalgamation of public sector banks effective 1 April 2020, which bank was merged into Indian Bank?

  4. The Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2020 is mainly associated with which of the following?

  5. Which of the following are indicators used in RBI's revised Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework for scheduled commercial banks? 1. Capital (CRAR and CET1) 2. Asset quality (net NPA ratio) 3. Leverage (Tier 1 leverage ratio) Select the correct answer using the code given below.

  6. The National Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (NARCL) acquires stressed loans from banks by paying

  7. The SARFAESI Act allows secured lenders to

Mains answer practice

Write your answer first, then open the points a good answer should cover.

  1. What problems in Indian banking did the Narasimham Committee (1991) try to solve? Assess how far later reforms, such as Basel III norms and the 2020 bank mergers, carried this agenda forward. (250 words)

    Show answer points
    • Before 1991, high CRR and SLR, fixed interest rates and limited entry made banks safe but inefficient, and bad loans were hidden.
    • The reforms cut SLR to 25% and CRR to 4.5%, deregulated interest rates and licensed new private banks.
    • Prudential norms on income recognition, asset classification and provisioning, with a capital ratio of 8%, made bad loans visible.
    • Basel III (9% minimum, CET1 5.5%, 2.5% buffer) carried the capital agenda further, and the 2020 mergers aimed at scale comparable to global banks.
    • Conclude with open issues such as governance, bad loans and the risk of banks that are too big to fail.
  2. Explain the 4R strategy adopted to deal with bad loans in public sector banks. What lessons does it hold for preventing a similar build-up in future? (250 words)

    Show answer points
    • Describe the build-up of stressed loans and how they were kept hidden before the 2015 Asset Quality Review.
    • Explain each R: recognition, resolution and recovery, recapitalisation (₹3.12 lakh crore over four years, ₹2.46 lakh crore from the government) and reforms.
    • Mention recovery tools such as SARFAESI and the IBC, the PCA framework and NARCL.
    • Lessons: honest recognition early, strong capital, better governance and credit appraisal in public sector banks.

Previous year questions

Previous year questions for UPSC CSE will appear here once each one is checked word for word against the official question paper.

Frequently asked questions

What is priority sector lending?

Under RBI directions, domestic commercial banks must lend 40% of their Adjusted Net Bank Credit, or of the off-balance-sheet equivalent if higher, to priority sectors such as agriculture and small enterprises.

What did the Narasimham Committee recommend?

Its 1991 report guided the bank reforms of the 1990s: SLR fell from 38.5% to 25% and CRR from 15% to 4.5%, along with freer interest rates and prudential norms.

What is the 4R strategy for public sector banks?

The 4R strategy covered Recognition of NPAs transparently, Resolution and recovery, Recapitalisation and Reforms.

What is the Basel III minimum capital requirement in India?

Banks must keep minimum total capital of 9% of risk-weighted assets and Common Equity Tier 1 of at least 5.5%, plus a capital conservation buffer of 2.5%.