UKPSC Lower PCS · Module 34 · standard depth · 14 min
Building with private partners: EPC, BOT, HAM, TOT, InvITs and monetisation
What UKPSC Lower PCS asks from this chapter
Syllabus lines this chapter covers:
- Prelims: General Studies (100) and General Aptitude Test (50) · Indian polity and Economy: Indian polity, Constitution, Panchayati raj and Community development, broad features of Indian economy and planning.
- Mains: General Studies Paper II · Indian economy.
UKPSC Lower PCS questions from this module are being sorted into our bank.
Cut to standard depth for UKPSC Lower PCS. 7 deeper paragraphs are in the full chapter.
Start from zero: building a road with someone else's money
Imagine your town needs a new road but the municipality has only half the money. It has three choices.
It can pay a contractor to build the road and wait until it has the full amount. It can let a private company build the road and collect toll from drivers for many years. Or it can share the cost and the risk with a private partner.
These are the basic ideas behind public-private partnerships (PPP) in infrastructure. Each model decides three things: who pays, who builds and runs the asset, and who takes the risk if traffic or costs turn out different from the plan.
This chapter explains the main models used in Indian highways, and two newer tools: InvITs and asset monetisation.
EPC, BOT, HAM and TOT
| Model | Who funds construction | Who collects toll | Traffic risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| EPC | Government (full) | Government | Government |
| BOT (Toll) | Private partner | Private partner | Private partner |
| Hybrid Annuity Model (HAM) | Government 40% during construction; private partner the rest | Government/authority | Government/authority |
| Toll-Operate-Transfer (TOT) | Government (road already built) | Private partner, for 30 years | Private partner |
EPC. The government pays a contractor to design, buy materials and build. It is simple, but limited by how much money the government has.
BOT (Toll). The private partner builds, operates and collects toll, so it bears the traffic risk. Some projects were not found viable on BOT (Toll).
HAM. Approved by the CCEA on 27 January 2016, HAM is used for projects not viable on BOT (Toll). The government pays 40% of the cost during construction and the remaining 60% as annuities with interest over the operations period. The private partner bears construction and maintenance risk, but the government collects toll and bears traffic and inflation risk.
TOT. A road built with public money and running for two years is bid out. A private firm pays NHAI an upfront lump sum for the right to collect toll for 30 years and maintains the road. The government gets money now to build new roads.
Which model when?
Bharatmala's plan. A 2018 government reply said that Bharatmala's base case was 60% HAM, 10% BOT (Toll) and the rest EPC.
The logic. EPC suits projects the government can fully fund. BOT (Toll) suits busy roads where toll income is reliable. HAM suits roads that are needed but may not earn enough toll to attract a fully private investor.
The trade-off: the more risk the government takes, the easier it is to attract private partners, but the more it must pay from the budget over time.
InvITs: owning a slice of a highway
What it is. An Infrastructure Investment Trust (InvIT) is a trust registered with SEBI under the InvIT Regulations, 2014. It raises money by issuing units to investors and invests mainly in infrastructure assets, such as toll roads or power lines.
The parties: a trustee, a sponsor, an investment manager and a project manager.
How investors earn. The assets earn income, for example from tolls. An InvIT must distribute at least 90% of its net distributable cash flows to unit holders. Listed units can be bought and sold like shares.
Types. Public InvITs offer units to the public and must be listed. Private InvITs are placed with institutional investors and may be listed or unlisted.
Why this matters: InvITs let a road builder or the government sell completed, earning assets to long-term investors and use the money to build new ones.
Asset monetisation and infrastructure finance
The National Monetisation Pipeline (NMP). Launched on 23 August 2021, the NMP estimated a monetisation potential of ₹6.0 lakh crore from the Central Government's core assets over FY2022 to FY2025.
Key ideas:
- It focuses on brownfield assets, which are already built and earning, with low risk.
- Ownership stays with the government, and assets are handed back at the end of the deal. It is not a sale of the asset.
- The largest shares were roads (27%) and railways (25%), followed by power (15%), oil and gas pipelines (8%) and telecom (6%).
Other financing tools:
- NaBFID, a development finance institution set up in 2021, had approved about ₹3.03 lakh crore and disbursed about ₹1.09 lakh crore by December 2025.
- NIIF, founded in 2015 and anchored by the government, invests in infrastructure.
- About ₹1.52 lakh crore of highway assets had been monetised through TOT and private InvITs.
Why this matters: monetisation recycles money from old assets into new ones, so the same rupee builds more roads.
When PPPs go wrong: lessons from the Kelkar Committee
Start with a broken promise. A private company wins a contract to build a toll road, expecting a certain number of vehicles. Then land acquisition is delayed for years, traffic is lower than forecast and the company runs out of money. The road stands half-built, the bank loan turns bad and both sides blame each other.
Why PPPs ran into trouble. Many PPP projects in India stalled in the years after the global financial crisis, for reasons like these. To understand why, the government set up a committee under Dr Vijay Kelkar, whose report was released in December 2015. Its core message was that risks had often been placed on the wrong party, and that the system had no good way to fix contracts when conditions changed.
Key recommendations. The committee said risk should be borne by the party best able to manage it, so that, for example, land acquisition stays with the government. It asked for a renegotiation framework to be written into bid documents, and for independent regulators in PPP sectors. It also proposed an Infrastructure PPP Project Review Committee and an Infrastructure PPP Adjudication Tribunal to resolve disputes quickly.
Honest officials and unsolicited bids. The committee recommended amending the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to separate genuine errors in decisions from corruption, because officials feared being punished for good-faith decisions on contracts. It said unsolicited proposals, known as the Swiss challenge, should be actively discouraged, as they can reduce transparency. Finally, it warned that PPPs should not be used as off-balance-sheet funding for responsibilities the government itself should fund.
Why it matters. The later shift to models like the Hybrid Annuity Model, where the government keeps traffic risk, reflects many of these lessons. PPP works only when risks, rules and dispute settlement are fair to both sides. A good Mains answer uses the Kelkar Committee to explain why some PPPs failed and how newer models try to fix them.
A bank for long roads: NaBFID
Start with a mismatch. A bank collects deposits that people may withdraw within a year or two. A highway or power plant needs a loan for fifteen or twenty years before it pays back fully. If banks lend short-term money for long-term projects, they take a big risk, which India learnt in the 2010s when many infrastructure loans turned bad.
The answer: a development bank. In 2021, India set up the National Bank for Financing Infrastructure and Development (NaBFID), a specialised development finance institution. Its job is to provide long-term finance for infrastructure, especially loans repaid from a project's own earnings rather than the owner's other assets. It also helps develop bond and derivatives markets, so that pension and insurance money, which is naturally long-term, can flow into infrastructure.
Early scale. By December 2025, NaBFID had approved about ₹3.03 lakh crore and disbursed about ₹1.09 lakh crore. Approvals run ahead of disbursement because infrastructure projects draw money in stages over many years. Together with InvITs and asset monetisation, this widens the sources of infrastructure finance beyond the government budget and commercial banks.
Why it matters. Infrastructure needs patient money, and India's earlier reliance on commercial banks contributed to the bad-loan crisis. A dedicated development bank and deeper bond markets reduce that risk. A good Mains answer explains the asset-liability mismatch and how NaBFID, InvITs and bond markets each help solve it.
Why so many PPP models: when, where and why
The problem: who carries the risk? A highway can lose money if fewer vehicles use it than expected, if costs rise, or if land is delayed. Each model divides these risks differently between the government and the private partner. Choosing a model means choosing who carries which risk.
Why HAM (2016). Under BOT (Toll) the private partner carries traffic risk, and under EPC the government pays for everything. When some projects were not found viable on BOT and EPC had its own limits, the government approved the Hybrid Annuity Model to revive highway projects. In HAM the authority takes traffic and inflation risk and pays 40% during construction, so the developer only partly bears financing risk.
Why TOT, InvITs and monetisation (2021). A finished, working highway is a low-risk asset that long-term investors like. By leasing such brownfield assets through TOT or InvITs, the government raises money now and spends it on new projects. The National Monetisation Pipeline calls this a key means of sustainable infrastructure financing, done through contractual partnerships, not privatisation, with ownership staying with the government.
Implications. The right model depends on the project: risky new roads suit EPC or HAM, while proven assets suit TOT or InvITs. A Mains answer should show that PPP design is about sharing risk fairly, not just about raising money.
Quick revision
- Under EPC, the government pays the full cost and the contractor only builds, while under BOT (Toll) a private firm builds, runs and collects toll, so it takes the traffic risk.
- The Hybrid Annuity Model, approved by the Cabinet on 27 January 2016, has the government pay 40% during construction and the remaining 60% as annuities with interest.
- Under HAM the government collects the toll, so it bears the traffic and inflation risk instead of the builder.
- Under TOT, a road that has run for two years is handed to a private firm for 30 years of toll rights in return for an upfront lump sum paid to NHAI.
- The base case for Bharatmala was 60% HAM, 10% BOT (Toll) and the rest EPC.
- An InvIT is governed by SEBI's 2014 Regulations, has a trustee, sponsor, investment manager and project manager, and must distribute at least 90% of its net distributable cash flow.
- The National Monetisation Pipeline (23 August 2021) listed ₹6.0 lakh crore of brownfield assets for FY22 to FY25, with ownership staying with the government, and roads (27%) and railways (25%) formed the largest shares.
- To fund long-term projects, the government also set up NIIF in 2015 and NaBFID in 2021.
- The Kelkar Committee (Dec 2015) said risk should sit with the party best able to bear it, asked for a renegotiation framework, independent regulators, a PPP review committee and tribunal, an amended Prevention of Corruption Act, and discouraged the Swiss challenge.
- NaBFID (2021) is a development finance institution for long-term infrastructure finance and bond-market development; approvals about ₹3.03 lakh crore by Dec 2025.
Common confusions and exam traps:
- In HAM, the private partner does not collect toll.
- Monetisation under NMP is not privatisation: ownership stays with the government.
- InvITs are regulated by SEBI, not RBI.