MPPSC SSE (State Service) · Module 36 · Mains depth · 19 min
Bank reforms: priority lending, capital rules, the 1991 reforms and the clean-up
What MPPSC SSE (State Service) asks from this chapter
Syllabus lines this chapter covers:
- Prelims Paper I: General Studies · Economy of India and MP
MPPSC SSE (State Service) has asked 1 question from this chapter (2023); 11 from its whole module.
Read at full depth: basics, the standard layer and the Mains analysis.
Start from zero: why banks need a rulebook
Start with a village savings group. Imagine twenty families who pool their savings, and one member keeps the money and lends it out. That member decides who gets loans, how much cash to keep aside, and how to record who has repaid. If the member lends only to friends, keeps no cash, or hides loans that have gone bad, the families can lose everything.
A bank faces the same four questions. It must decide who gets credit, how much of its own money to keep as a cushion against losses, whether its books are honest about bad loans, and who watches it and how big it may grow. A bank holds the savings of millions of people, so a wrong answer to any of these hurts far more people than one village group.
This chapter follows India's answers. The country first told banks where some credit must go, through priority sector lending. It then set rules for capital, cleaned up how banks count income and bad loans after 1991, and later tackled a mountain of bad loans and reshaped the banks themselves. Each answer came at a particular time, to solve a particular problem, and each brought new problems of its own.
Why it matters. Banks are the main bridge between savings and investment in India. When the rules are right, savings reach farms, factories and homes safely. When they are wrong, bad loans pile up, credit dries up and taxpayers often pay to rescue the banks.
Priority sector lending: telling banks where some credit must go
Start with a simple choice. Suppose you run a bank and have ₹1 crore to lend. You could give it to one large company, or give ₹50,000 each to two hundred small farmers. The single big loan is cheaper to check and easier to collect, so a bank that only seeks profit will usually choose it.
The result of that choice. If every bank thinks this way, farmers, tiny firms and poor households get very little formal credit, even when many of them would repay. They then turn to moneylenders who charge far higher interest. Economists call this a market failure in credit, because the market alone does not send money where it would do a lot of good.
What the rule says. The RBI's directions on priority sector lending (PSL) tell banks to give a fixed share of their credit to such sectors. For domestic commercial banks, the overall target is 40% of Adjusted Net Bank Credit (ANBC) or Credit Equivalent of Off-Balance Sheet Exposure (CEOBSE), whichever is higher. Within this 40%, 18% must go to agriculture and 12% to weaker sections.
What these terms mean. ANBC is, roughly, the bank's total lending after a few adjustments that the RBI lists. CEOBSE counts business that does not sit on the balance sheet. Taking whichever is higher stops a bank from shrinking its target by moving business off its books.
Why it was introduced. PSL grows from the same idea as the nationalisation of 1969, which was that bank credit should follow national priorities and not only private profit. Nationalisation gave the government ownership of most bank lending, and PSL gave it a rule to steer that lending. This kind of policy is called directed credit.
Why it matters. PSL has kept credit flowing to farms, small firms and weaker sections that banks would otherwise ignore. The cost is that some of these loans are riskier and costlier to handle, and loans given only to meet a target can turn bad. A balanced answer says that PSL corrects a real market failure, but it works only when banks still judge each borrower carefully.
Capital adequacy: why a bank must keep its own money at risk
Start with a shopkeeper. Think of a shopkeeper who sells goods on credit to regular customers. If a few customers never pay, the shopkeeper covers the loss from their own savings and the shop stays open. A bank works the same way, and its own capital is that cushion: when loans go bad, capital takes the first hit so that depositors do not.
Not all loans are equally risky. A loan to the government is far safer than an unsecured loan to a new company. So the rules give each asset a risk weight, and the weighted total is called risk-weighted assets (RWAs). A bank's capital is then measured as a share of its RWAs, a ratio called the capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR).
Where the rules come from. The Basel rules are international standards for bank capital, named after the Swiss city where central banks meet to agree on them. The third set, Basel III, was drawn up after the global financial crisis of 2008 showed that many banks held too little capital of good quality. India applies these standards through the RBI's capital rules.
India's Basel III numbers. Banks must keep a minimum total capital of 9% of RWAs. Of this, Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), the purest capital made of shareholders' equity and reserves, must be at least 5.5%. On top of this, banks must keep a capital conservation buffer (CCB) of 2.5% in the form of CET1, which brings CET1 with the buffer to 8% and total capital with the buffer to 11.5%.
Why a buffer on top. The buffer is meant to be built up in good times and drawn down in bad times. A bank that falls into its buffer faces limits on paying out profits, for example as dividends, until it rebuilds capital. This pushes banks to keep extra strength before trouble comes rather than after.
Why it matters. More capital makes banks safer, but capital is costly, so a bank with thin capital has to slow its lending. This is why weak capital in banks can choke credit to the whole economy. It is also why the government, as owner, has at times had to put fresh capital into public sector banks.
The 1991 reforms: from controlled banks to competing banks
The problem in 1991. By 1991 a large part of every deposit was locked up by rules, because banks had to hold high reserves with the RBI and in government securities. Interest rates were set from above, and very few new banks could enter the market. Banks were safe from competition, but many were inefficient, and their accounts did not show bad loans clearly.
The Narasimham Committee (1991). The Committee on the Financial System, chaired by M. Narasimham, reported in November 1991 and set the direction of reform, and the RBI says the banking reforms of the 1990s were guided mainly by its recommendations. Over that decade the SLR fell from 38.5% to 25% and the CRR from 15% to 4.5%, which freed money for lending. Interest rates were deregulated, and entry rules were eased so that new private sector banks could be licensed from 1993.
Cleaning up the books. The reforms also brought prudential norms on income recognition, asset classification and provisioning. In plain words, a bank could no longer count unpaid interest as income, had to label a loan as bad once payments stopped, and had to set money aside for likely losses. A capital ratio of 8% came in at the same time, and it was the forerunner of today's Basel III rules.
Why it matters. The 1991 reforms changed what a bank is for, from a channel for directed credit into a business that must earn, count and provision honestly. Lower reserve rules freed money for lending, and competition from new private banks pushed public sector banks to improve. The prudential norms are also why bad loans could later be measured at all, which made the clean-up of the 2010s possible.
The clean-up: recognising and resolving bad loans
The problem after 2010. During the boom years before 2010, banks lent heavily to large companies for steel, power, roads and other big projects. Many of these projects stalled, but banks often kept rolling over the loans instead of calling them bad. So the true size of the problem stayed hidden, and the banks kept lending as if nothing was wrong.
Step one: see the problem honestly. In 2015 the RBI began an Asset Quality Review (AQR), checking banks' books loan by loan. Many stressed loans that had been shown as healthy were reclassified as non-performing assets (NPAs), so bad loans on paper shot up. This was painful, but a problem that is hidden cannot be fixed.
The 4R strategy. The government described its response as 4R: Recognition of NPAs transparently, Resolution and recovery of value from stressed loans, Recapitalisation of public sector banks, and Reforms in banks and the wider financial system. Recapitalisation was large, because banks that recognise losses lose capital. Over the four years to 2018-19, public sector banks received ₹3.12 lakh crore of fresh capital, of which ₹2.46 lakh crore came from the government.
Tools to recover money. The SARFAESI Act lets secured lenders recover dues of more than ₹1 lakh by acting against the assets pledged for a loan, without going to court. A borrower who feels wronged can appeal to the Debts Recovery Tribunal. For large companies, the main tool since 2016 is the bankruptcy code, which the chapter on bad loans explains in full.
A watchman for weak banks. Under the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework, the RBI steps in early when a bank's health slips. The revised framework of 2 November 2021 watches three things: capital (CRAR and CET1), asset quality (net NPA ratio, where the first warning level is 6%) and leverage. A bank under PCA faces limits, for example on expansion, until it recovers.
A bank for bad loans. In September 2021 the Cabinet approved a government guarantee of up to ₹30,600 crore for security receipts issued by the National Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (NARCL). NARCL is meant to take over about ₹2 lakh crore of stressed loans in phases, paying banks 15% in cash and 85% in security receipts. The idea is that one buyer can take faster, single-point decisions on loans that many banks share.
Why it matters. The clean-up shows the order in which a banking crisis must be fixed: first recognise the losses, then recover what you can, then rebuild capital, then change the rules so it does not happen again. Each step has a cost, especially the taxpayer money used for recapitalisation and guarantees. A good Mains answer weighs that cost against the far bigger cost of banks that cannot lend.
Reshaping the banks: mergers and cooperative banks (2020)
Mega consolidation (2020). From 1 April 2020, ten public sector banks were merged into four. Oriental Bank of Commerce and United Bank of India joined Punjab National Bank, Syndicate Bank joined Canara Bank, Andhra Bank and Corporation Bank joined Union Bank of India, and Allahabad Bank joined Indian Bank. The government said the move would create banks with scale comparable to global banks, with cost benefits and better risk management.
Cooperative banks brought closer to the RBI (2020). Cooperative banks are also cooperative societies, so for a long time the RBI had fewer powers over how they were run than over commercial banks. The Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2020 gave the RBI additional powers over them in areas such as management, audit, capital, and reconstruction or amalgamation. For urban cooperative banks it applied from 26 June 2020.
Why it matters. Each reform answers a weakness of the system before it. The Narasimham reforms tackled inefficiency and hidden bad loans, Basel norms tackle thin capital, mergers tackle small size, and the 2020 Act tackles weak oversight of cooperative banks. Each step also brings new questions, such as staff and branch cuts after mergers and the risk that very large banks become "too big to fail", so a good Mains answer traces the chain from problem to reform to the next problem.

Mains practice: six questions, six angles
These are practice questions written by us, not past papers. Past questions from each exam are in the PYQ panel of this module.
| Angle | Question | Key points to cover |
|---|---|---|
| Why (origin) | Why did India need banking reforms in 1991? Assess what they achieved. | Describe locked-up reserves, fixed rates, little competition and hidden bad loans. Then show lower SLR and CRR, prudential norms, the 8% capital ratio and new private banks. |
| Inclusion | Is priority sector lending still relevant? Discuss. | Explain the market failure in credit and the 40%, 18% and 12% targets. Then weigh reach against risk and suggest better credit appraisal. |
| Safety | Explain the purpose of Basel III capital norms. Do they restrict credit growth? | Explain risk-weighted assets, the 9% minimum, CET1 and the 2.5% buffer. Then weigh safety against the cost of capital. |
| Crisis | Evaluate the 4R strategy for resolving bad loans in public sector banks. | Cover the AQR of 2015, recapitalisation of ₹3.12 lakh crore, SARFAESI, the IBC and PCA. Then discuss the cost to taxpayers and the need for governance reform. |
| Debate | "Bigger banks are better banks." Examine with reference to the 2020 mergers. | Give the four mergers and the aim of global scale. Then weigh cost savings and risk management against job cuts, culture clashes and the risk of being too big to fail. |
| Way forward | How can a bad bank like NARCL help, and what are its risks? | Explain the 15% cash and 85% security receipts model and the ₹30,600 crore guarantee. Then discuss speed of decisions against moral hazard and the cost of the guarantee. |
How to use this table: each answer should explain the what, then the why from the sections above, and end with a way forward.
Quick revision
- Under priority sector lending, domestic commercial banks must lend 40% of ANBC or CEOBSE, whichever is higher, including 18% to agriculture and 12% to weaker sections.
- Under RBI's Basel III rules, banks keep minimum total capital of 9% of risk-weighted assets, CET1 of at least 5.5%, and a 2.5% conservation buffer, which makes 11.5% in all.
- The Narasimham Committee (1991) guided the 1990s reforms, which cut the SLR to 25% and the CRR to 4.5%, brought in prudential norms and an 8% capital ratio, freed interest rates and let in new private banks.
- The RBI's Asset Quality Review began in 2015, and the government's 4R strategy covered recognition, resolution, recapitalisation and reforms.
- The SARFAESI Act lets secured lenders recover dues above ₹1 lakh from pledged assets without going to court, and the revised PCA framework (2021) lets the RBI step in early when a bank weakens.
- NARCL got a government guarantee of up to ₹30,600 crore in 2021 to buy stressed loans for 15% cash and 85% security receipts.
- From 1 April 2020, ten public sector banks were merged into four, and the Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2020 gave the RBI more powers over cooperative banks.
MPPSC SSE (State Service) questions from this chapter
How many banks were nationalized in India in 1980?
- (a) 4
- (b) 6
- (c) 14
- (d) 20
Show answer
(b) 6 · our answer; official key awaited