MPPSC SSE (State Service) · Module 36 · Mains depth · 21 min
Bad loans and their cure: NPAs and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
What MPPSC SSE (State Service) asks from this chapter
Syllabus lines this chapter covers:
- Prelims Paper I: General Studies · Economy of India and MP
11 MPPSC SSE (State Service) questions in our bank come from this module (Money and banking).
Read at full depth: basics, the standard layer and the Mains analysis.
Start from zero: when a loan is not repaid
Imagine a village self-help group of twenty women. Each month every member saves ₹500. The group lends the pooled money to members who need it, for a buffalo, a sewing machine or a child's fees, and they repay with a little interest.
One year the group lends a large sum to a brick-kiln owner. Then the rains come early, the kiln shuts and the owner stops paying. Months pass. The group has less money to lend, and when a member needs her savings back urgently, there is not enough in the box.
That one bad loan has hurt the whole group. Banks work on the same principle, only with crores of depositors. They take our deposits and lend them out. When a large share of loans stops paying, the bank has less to lend, earns less and can even put depositors' money at risk.
Such loans are called non-performing assets (NPAs): for a bank, a loan is an asset, and when it stops earning, it is non-performing. This chapter explains when a loan is officially called an NPA, why NPAs pile up, how they hurt the economy, and how India's Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) tries to recover the money.
When does a loan become an NPA?
First, "overdue". RBI defines an amount as overdue when any amount due under a loan is not paid on the due date fixed by the bank. Being overdue for a few days is common and does not make a loan bad.
The 90-day rule. According to RBI's definitions, a term loan becomes a non-performing asset when interest and/or an instalment of principal remains overdue for more than 90 days. For an overdraft or cash credit account, the test is different: the account becomes an NPA if it stays "out of order" for 90 days. Broadly, this means the balance stays above the sanctioned limit or drawing power for that period.
The ladder of NPAs. Once a loan is an NPA, it moves down a ladder as time passes:
- Substandard asset: an advance that has remained non-performing for 12 months or less.
- Doubtful asset: an advance that has remained in the substandard category for 12 months.
- Loss asset: the last stage, where the loss is recognised as practically unrecoverable.
Why the ladder matters. The further down the ladder, the less likely the money will come back. So banks must set aside more of their own money as provisions against older bad loans. Provisions reduce a bank's profit, which is why NPAs show up directly in bank results.
Gross and net NPAs. Gross NPAs are the total of all bad loans. Net NPAs are gross NPAs minus the provisions already made. The gross NPA ratio (gross NPAs as a share of total loans) is the most common measure of a bank's asset quality.
Why do loans go bad?
Not every bad loan is fraud. Most NPAs come from a mix of business risk, poor lending and bad timing.
- Economic slowdown. When demand falls, companies sell less and earn less. Borrowers who were healthy in good times may be unable to repay in bad times.
- Stalled projects. Big infrastructure and industrial projects, such as power plants, roads and steel mills, need years to finish. Delays in land acquisition, environmental clearances or fuel supply can stop the cash flow that was meant to repay the loan.
- Weak lending checks. In boom years, banks may lend too freely, without checking the borrower's ability to repay or the project's real prospects. Lending too much to one group or sector concentrates the risk.
- Wilful default. Some borrowers can repay but choose not to, or move money out of the company. This is the smallest part by number but causes great public anger.
- Sector shocks. A fall in global commodity prices, a policy change or a natural disaster can hit a whole sector at once, such as steel, telecom or agriculture in a drought year.
The twin balance sheet problem. When companies are over-borrowed and banks are full of bad loans at the same time, both sides become cautious. Companies stop investing and banks stop lending. Economists call this the twin balance sheet problem, and it can hold back growth for years.
Why this matters: the cure depends on the cause. Slowdown-driven NPAs need time and recovery, stalled projects need faster clearances, weak lending needs better bank governance, and wilful default needs strong legal action.
How bad loans hurt the economy
1. Banks lend less. Provisions against NPAs eat into profits and capital. A bank with less capital must lend less, because RBI's rules require it to hold enough capital against its loans. Small businesses and new projects find it harder to borrow.
2. Loans become costlier. Banks try to make up for losses by keeping lending rates high or deposit rates low. This weakens the effect of RBI's rate cuts, because banks do not pass on lower rates fully (see The RBI and monetary policy: repo rate, CRR, SLR and the MPC).
3. Investment and jobs suffer. When banks are cautious and companies are over-borrowed, fresh investment slows. Fewer factories and roads mean fewer jobs and slower growth.
4. Taxpayers pay. Most of the large public sector banks are owned by the government. When their capital falls, the government has to put in more money, called recapitalisation. That money comes from the budget, which means less for schools, health or roads.
5. Trust is shaken. If people fear for their deposits, they may withdraw money in a hurry. A healthy banking system depends on depositors' confidence, so keeping NPAs low is part of financial stability.
Why this matters: NPAs are not just a bank's private problem. They pass through to interest rates, investment, the budget and public trust, which is why the government and RBI have spent so much effort on recognising and resolving them.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code: how it works
Before the IBC, a lender trying to recover money from a failed company often faced years in courts, with several laws and forums that overlapped. Meanwhile the company's assets lost value, and lenders recovered little.
The IBC, 2016. Parliament passed the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Act No. 31 of 2016), dated 28 May 2016, to bring one time-bound process for resolving insolvency. Its key institutions are:
- the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI), the regulator;
- the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), the Adjudicating Authority for companies;
- insolvency professionals, who run the process;
- the committee of creditors (CoC), made up of the financial creditors, which takes the key decisions.
The process for a company (CIRP), step by step:
- Default. The company fails to pay a debt. Section 4 sets the minimum default at ₹1 lakh in the Act, and allows the Central Government to notify a higher amount of up to ₹1 crore.
- Application to NCLT. A financial creditor, an operational creditor (such as a supplier) or the company itself applies.
- Admission and moratorium. If NCLT admits the case, an insolvency professional takes charge of the company, and a moratorium stops other lawsuits and recovery actions, so that the company is not torn apart.
- Resolution plan. Bidders submit plans to revive the company. The CoC votes on them. The CIRP period is 180 days from the insolvency commencement date (Section 5(14)), and it can be extended under the Code.
- Outcome. If a plan is approved by the CoC and NCLT, the company continues under new terms or new owners. If not, it goes into liquidation: its assets are sold and the money is shared among creditors in a fixed order.
The big shift: "creditor in control". Before the IBC, the old owners usually stayed in charge during recovery. Under the IBC, control passes to the insolvency professional and the creditors. This changed the behaviour of borrowers, many of whom started paying to avoid losing their companies.
Who can use the IBC, and how is money shared?
Two kinds of creditors.
- Financial creditors have lent money, such as banks and bondholders. They form the committee of creditors and vote on the resolution plan.
- Operational creditors are owed money for goods or services, such as suppliers, contractors and employees. They can start the process but usually do not vote in the CoC.
Liquidation as the last resort. If no plan is approved, the company is liquidated. The Code lays down an order of payment, often called the waterfall, so that every class of creditor knows where it stands. The costs of the process come first, and the old shareholders come last.
Individuals and partnerships. The IBC also has parts for individuals and partnership firms. In practice, the corporate process before NCLT has been used the most, and it is the focus for the exam.
Why this matters: clear rules on who decides and who gets paid first make lending less risky. Over time, this should lower the cost of credit and encourage banks to lend to productive businesses.
Ten years on: the 2026 Amendment
The IBC completed ten years in 2026. Experience showed two big problems: cases took much longer than the Code intended, and many companies reached the tribunal too late, when little value was left. Parliament responded with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026 (Act No. 6 of 2026), which received assent on 6 April 2026.
Key changes:
- A creditor-initiated insolvency resolution process. A new chapter lets creditors start a faster process, to be completed within 150 days, with one extension of up to 45 days on a 66% vote of the committee of creditors.
- Group insolvency. A new chapter deals with the insolvency of a group of related companies together, instead of one company at a time.
- Harder to withdraw. Withdrawing an application after admission now needs a 90% vote of the committee of creditors.
- Faster appeals. The NCLAT is to dispose of appeals within three months.
- Penalty for misuse. A new provision allows a penalty of ₹1 lakh to ₹2 crore for frivolous or vexatious proceedings.
- Time limit for liquidation. Liquidation is to be completed within 180 days, with an extension of up to 90 days.
What did not change. This Act did not amend Section 12, which sets the 180-day time limit for completing the CIRP, or the default threshold in Section 4.
Why this matters: the amendments aim at speed and value. The earlier a stressed company is caught, and the faster the case moves, the more of its value can be saved for creditors, workers and the economy.
Why India needed a bankruptcy code: when, where and why
The problem: money stuck for years. When a company cannot repay, its lenders need a way to either rescue it or sell its assets quickly. Before 2016 India had several overlapping laws and forums for this. IBBI describes the old structure as confusing, with many laws, long delays and low recoveries.
How bad were recoveries? Citing RBI data for 2018-19, IBBI compares recovery rates: about 14.5% under SARFAESI, 3.54% through Debt Recovery Tribunals and 5.3% through Lok Adalats, against 42.5% under the Code. Each year of delay makes a stressed firm's machines older and its customers fewer, so value melts away.
Where the answer came from. Parliament replaced the patchwork with a single law, enacting the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code on 28 May 2016. Corporate insolvency cases could start by 1 December 2016. IBBI states the Code's aim as time-bound resolution for maximising the value of assets, with resolution as the first goal and liquidation only as the last resort.
What changed in practice. The Code set a 180-day resolution period, put a committee of creditors in charge of deciding the firm's future, and created the IBBI, insolvency professionals and information utilities. Because a defaulting promoter can lose control of the company, the Code is widely seen as changing borrower behaviour even before cases are filed.
Implications and limits. Recoveries improved, but many cases still take far longer than 180 days, and large haircuts (the share of debt that lenders give up) draw criticism. The 2026 amendment adds a creditor-initiated process and tighter timelines to tackle these delays. A good answer weighs speed and value against the capacity of tribunals.
Mains lens: has the IBC worked?
1. The gains. The IBC changed the culture of borrowing. Because owners could lose control of their companies, many settled their dues before or soon after a case was filed. It gave India one law and one forum for corporate insolvency, and created a market for stressed assets, with new buyers reviving failed firms.
2. The problems. Cases have often taken far longer than the 180-day period, because of crowded tribunals, repeated litigation and appeals. Long delays reduce the value of the company, so lenders often accept large haircuts, recovering only a part of what was owed. Some cases ended in liquidation, where recovery is usually lower than in a successful resolution.
3. The way forward.
- More NCLT benches and members, with better infrastructure, to cut delays.
- Earlier detection of stress, so that companies enter the process while they still have value; the 2026 creditor-initiated process is a step in this direction.
- Limits on frivolous litigation, now backed by penalties.
- Better information on companies' finances, so that bidders can value them quickly.
A good conclusion: the IBC has made lenders stronger and borrowers more disciplined, but its promise depends on speed. Strengthening the tribunals and catching stress early are the keys to turning the law into faster, higher recoveries.
Mains lens: writing an answer on NPAs and the IBC
A typical question: "What are non-performing assets? Examine the role of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code in resolving stressed assets in India." (250 words)
Introduction (2 lines): Define NPA: a loan whose interest or principal is overdue for more than 90 days (RBI); classified as substandard, doubtful and loss.
Body:
- Causes: slowdown, stalled projects, weak lending checks, wilful default, sector shocks; twin balance sheet problem.
- Effects: lower lending, costlier credit, weaker transmission, recapitalisation burden, financial stability risk.
- IBC mechanism: IBC 2016, IBBI, NCLT, CoC; time-bound CIRP of 180 days; creditor in control; liquidation as last resort.
- Performance and reforms: behavioural change and one forum versus delays and haircuts; 2026 Amendment: creditor-initiated process (150 + 45 days), group insolvency, 90% CoC to withdraw, NCLAT in three months, penalties for frivolous cases.
Conclusion (2 lines): clean bank balance sheets are a precondition for credit-led growth; the IBC's success depends on speed and early detection.
Useful keywords: overdue, 90-day norm, provisioning, gross and net NPA, twin balance sheet, moratorium, committee of creditors, resolution plan, haircut, liquidation waterfall.
Mains practice: six questions, six angles
These are practice questions written by us, not past papers. Past questions from each exam are in the PYQ panel of this module.
| Angle | Question | Key points to cover |
|---|---|---|
| Why (origin) | Why was the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code enacted in 2016? | Explain that many overlapping laws caused delays and very low recovery, such as 14.5% under SARFAESI and 3.54% through debt tribunals. The new Code aimed to maximise the value of stressed assets. |
| Evaluate | Has the IBC achieved its objectives? Critically evaluate. | Credit it with 42.5% recovery and a change in borrower behaviour. Then weigh the delays beyond 180 days, large haircuts and limited tribunal capacity. |
| Concept | What is an NPA? How do NPAs hurt the wider economy? | Define an NPA by the 90-day rule and explain provisioning. Then show how bad loans lead to less lending and higher rates, and explain the twin balance sheet problem. |
| Reform | Discuss the main changes made by the IBC (Amendment) Act, 2026. | Explain the creditor-initiated process within 150 days and the 90% vote needed to withdraw a case. Then add the new timelines for NCLAT appeals. |
| Governance | Why do bad loans pile up in public sector banks? Suggest remedies. | Point to weak credit appraisal, political pressure and economic cycles. Then suggest governance reform and early recognition of stress. |
| Way forward | Suggest ways to speed up insolvency resolution in India. | Suggest more NCLT benches, pre-packaged cases and trained professionals. Then add strict timelines and better information utilities. |
How to use this table: each answer should explain the what, then the why from the section above, and end with a way forward.
Quick revision
- A loan is overdue when it is not paid on the due date fixed by the bank.
- A term loan becomes an NPA when interest or principal stays overdue for more than 90 days, and an overdraft or cash credit account becomes one when it stays out of order for 90 days.
- An NPA is substandard for its first 12 months, it becomes doubtful after 12 months in that category, and it is finally classed as a loss asset.
- Gross NPA counts all bad loans, while net NPA is what remains after subtracting the provisions banks have set aside.
- The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Act No. 31 of 2016) came on 28 May 2016, with IBBI as its regulator and the NCLT as the adjudicating authority for companies.
- Under Section 4, the minimum default is ₹1 lakh in the Act, but the government can notify a higher limit of up to ₹1 crore.
- The resolution process (CIRP) must finish within 180 days under Section 5(14), and the committee of creditors takes the key decisions.
- The 2026 Amendment (Act No. 6 of 2026, 6 April 2026) added a creditor-initiated process of 150 + 45 days and group insolvency.
- It also requires a 90% vote of the creditors' committee to withdraw a case, NCLAT appeals within 3 months, and a penalty of ₹1 lakh to ₹2 crore for frivolous cases.
Common confusions and exam traps:
- The 90-day rule counts from when payment becomes overdue, not from the loan's start.
- Operational creditors can file a case but usually do not vote in the CoC.
- The NCLT decides company cases; the IBBI regulates; they are not the same body.
- The 2026 Amendment did not change the 180-day CIRP period.