UPPSC PCS · Module 43 · Mains depth · 16 min
India and China (2): trade, technology, the Belt and Road and the way ahead
What UPPSC PCS asks from this chapter
Syllabus lines this chapter covers:
- Prelims: General Studies I · Current events of national and international importance
- Mains: GS V and VI (Uttar Pradesh) · Current affairs of Uttar Pradesh
UPPSC PCS questions from this module are being sorted into our bank.
Read at full depth: basics, the standard layer and the Mains analysis.
Start from zero: a rival who is also your biggest supplier
Imagine a shopkeeper whose neighbour across the road is both a rival and the cheapest wholesaler in town. The two argue over a strip of land between their shops, yet the shopkeeper buys much of his stock from that neighbour. Stopping all purchases would hurt his own business, but buying everything makes him dependent.
That is India's economic dilemma with China. The previous chapter, India and China (1), covered the boundary and the 2020 crisis. This chapter covers trade, investment, technology, the Belt and Road and the places where the two still work together.
India's guiding idea is simple. The relationship can grow alongside talks on the boundary, but serious disturbance on the LAC is bound to affect the relationship as a whole. After 2020, India applied this idea to the economy as well.
So the chapter asks three questions. How deep is the economic link, what has India done to reduce its risks, and how should India balance competition and cooperation from here on?
Trade: big, lopsided and hard to fix
The numbers. China is one of India's largest trading partners, but the trade is badly lopsided. In 2017-18, India exported about US$ 13.3 billion to China and imported about US$ 76.4 billion, leaving a trade deficit of about US$ 63 billion. By 2019-20 the deficit was still about US$ 48.6 billion.
How China became number one. Trade grew fast once ties improved from the late 1980s. In 2008, China replaced the United States as India's largest goods trading partner. On paper the two economies fit together, since India is strong in software, IT services and pharmaceuticals and China in electronic hardware and building infrastructure.
Why the gap. India buys machinery, electronics, chemicals and many inputs that its factories need, while it sells China mostly raw materials and simple goods. India has also complained that non-tariff barriers, such as slow approvals and strict standards, keep many Indian products out of the Chinese market.
What India has tried. India has pressed China on these barriers, and protocols were signed to allow exports of Indian rice, tobacco, fishmeal and fish oil, and chilli meal. India has also promoted buyer-seller meets and trade fairs, and built up domestic manufacturing to replace some imports.
Reading the trend. The deficit fell from about US$ 63 billion in 2017-18 to about US$ 53.6 billion in 2018-19 and about US$ 48.6 billion in 2019-20. That fall came mostly because imports dropped, not because exports rose sharply. So a smaller deficit does not by itself mean that India has become less dependent.
Why it matters. A large deficit is not only an economic problem. It means that key inputs for Indian industry depend on a country with which India has a live border dispute, which is a strategic risk.
Partnership on paper: 2005 to 2019
The partnership labels. In April 2005, the two countries set up a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. In September 2014, during President Xi's visit, they agreed on a Closer Developmental Partnership focused on investment and infrastructure.
Informal summits. To build personal trust, the two leaders held informal summits at Wuhan on 27-28 April 2018 and at Chennai (Mamallapuram) on 11-12 October 2019. These meetings had no fixed agenda and aimed to keep tensions from spilling over.
Meeting on common platforms. India and China are both members of BRICS, the SCO and the G20, so their leaders meet often. The Prime Minister went to China for the G20 in Hangzhou (2016), BRICS in Xiamen (2017), the SCO in Qingdao (2018) and the SCO in Tianjin (2025).
Why it matters. These steps show that both sides wanted a working relationship despite the dispute. The shock of 2020 showed, however, that warm summits cannot replace respect for agreements on the ground.
After 2020: guarding the economy
Screening investment. In April 2020, as COVID-19 hit company values, India issued Press Note 3. It said that any investment from an entity of a country sharing a land border with India, or whose beneficial owner is in such a country, could come only through the Government route. The stated aim was to curb opportunistic takeovers of weakened Indian firms.
Blocking apps. On 29 June 2020, two weeks after Galwan, the government used section 69A of the Information Technology Act to block 59 mobile apps. It said they were prejudicial to India's sovereignty, defence, security and public order and were sending users' data to servers outside India.
A calibrated easing. In March 2026, the Cabinet eased the investment rules without dropping them. Investors with non-controlling beneficial ownership of up to 10% from land-border countries may now come through the automatic route. Proposals in sectors such as electronic components, capital goods, polysilicon and wafers are to be decided within 60 days, with majority control staying with resident Indians.
Why these tools were chosen. Each step uses an ordinary legal power rather than a trade war. Press Note 3 changes the FDI route, and the app ban uses an existing section of the IT Act. This lets India act quickly, keep trade in goods flowing and adjust the rules later, as it did in 2026.
Why it matters. These steps show a new idea in Indian policy: economic security. India wants investment and technology that help its factories, but not control of sensitive firms or data by a rival.
The Belt and Road and CPEC: why India says no
What it is. China's Belt and Road Initiative is a vast plan of roads, railways, ports and pipelines across Asia, Africa and Europe, mostly built with Chinese loans. Its flagship in South Asia is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which runs from western China through Pakistan to the Arabian Sea.
India's objection. India rejects what it calls the so-called CPEC because some of its projects are in Indian territory under Pakistan's illegal occupation. India resolutely opposes any move to legitimise that occupation, since joining or accepting such projects would weaken its claim. India has also said that Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh are integral and inalienable parts of India.
The wider worry. Beyond sovereignty, many Indian experts worry that heavy loans can trap smaller countries in debt and give the lender influence over ports and land. That is why India's own offer, explained in the Neighbourhood First chapter, stresses grants, demand-driven projects and local ownership.
Other doors India kept shut. The same worry about cheap Chinese goods shaped other choices. India did not join a proposed India-Nepal-China economic corridor, which Nepal welcomed, and it stayed out of the RCEP trade pact, fearing that Chinese products would flood its market through these routes.
Why it matters. CPEC shows how the China and Pakistan questions are tied together. It also explains why India prefers alternative connectivity projects with partners, which you will meet in later modules.
After 2024: a cautious return to normal
What has moved. After disengagement in 2024, some normal links returned. Direct flights between the two countries resumed in October 2025, and the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra for Indian pilgrims resumed in 2025 via Lipulekh and Nathu La.
What has not. Large forces still face each other along the LAC, and the trade gap remains wide. India keeps its investment screening, now in a more targeted form, and continues to reject CPEC.
India's rule of thumb. India's position stays the same: ties can grow alongside boundary talks, but serious disturbance on the LAC is bound to affect the relationship. So every step towards normal life is linked to continued calm on the border.
Where they still meet. Both countries sit in BRICS, the SCO and the G20, so their leaders keep meeting even in tense years. The Tianjin SCO Summit in September 2025 was one such meeting, and it came after flights and pilgrim visits had begun to return.
Why it matters. This step-by-step approach lets India gain from trade and contact without lowering its guard. It is the economic face of the same strategic autonomy that guides India's wider foreign policy.
When, where and why: the economic story at a glance
The table puts the economic and political steps of this chapter in order.
| When | What | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Apr 2005 | Strategic and Cooperative Partnership | Framework for wider ties |
| Sep 2014 | Closer Developmental Partnership | Focus on investment and infrastructure |
| 2017-18 | Trade deficit about US$ 63 billion | Shows dependence on imports |
| 2018 and 2019 | Wuhan and Chennai informal summits | Personal trust-building |
| Apr 2020 | Press Note 3 | Screens investment from land-border countries |
| 29 Jun 2020 | 59 apps blocked | Data and security concerns |
| 13 Jun 2024 | India rejects references to CPEC | Sovereignty over occupied territory |
| Oct 2025 | Direct flights resume | Cautious normalisation |
| Mar 2026 | Investment rules eased for small stakes | Balance growth and security |
Why it matters. The table shows a shift from hopeful partnership to guarded engagement. India now trades and talks with China, but with rules that protect its security.
Mains lens: compete, cooperate or both?
1. The case for decoupling. Heavy dependence on a rival for key inputs is risky, as border crises can turn into supply shocks. Data security and control of sensitive firms are real concerns. Screening investment and building domestic capacity reduce these risks.
2. The case for engagement. Cheap Chinese inputs help many Indian factories, especially small ones, to stay competitive. Cutting them off suddenly would raise costs and slow growth. Some Chinese investment in manufacturing can also bring technology and jobs.
3. The middle path India chose. India has neither cut ties nor gone back to business as usual. It screens investment but eases rules for small, non-controlling stakes in sectors it wants to grow, keeps control with Indian owners and links normal ties to peace on the border. It rejects CPEC on grounds of sovereignty.
4. A balanced conclusion. India's best path is de-risking, not decoupling. That means diversifying supply chains with other partners, building its own manufacturing, using rules to protect strategic sectors and keeping channels open with China. Economic strength at home is the surest way to deal with China as an equal.
Mains practice: five questions, five angles
These are practice questions written by us, not past papers. Past questions from each exam are in the PYQ panel of this module.
| Angle | Question | Key points to cover |
|---|---|---|
| Trade | Examine the causes of India's trade deficit with China and suggest remedies. | Use the 2017-18 figures and the import mix. Then discuss non-tariff barriers, export protocols and domestic manufacturing. |
| Security | "Economic security has become part of India's China policy since 2020." Discuss. | Cover Press Note 3, app blocking and the 2026 easing. Show how India balances investment needs and security. |
| Connectivity | Why does India oppose CPEC, and what alternatives does it offer the region? | State the sovereignty objection in India's words. Then contrast debt-heavy projects with India's grants and demand-driven model. |
| Platforms | Assess the role of BRICS and the SCO in managing India-China relations. | Cite summit meetings from Hangzhou to Kazan and Tianjin. Then weigh their value as meeting grounds against their limits in settling disputes. |
| Way ahead | Should India de-risk or decouple from China? Argue your case. | Define both terms. Then argue for de-risking with supply-chain diversification, domestic capacity and guarded engagement. |
How to use this table: each answer should give one hard number or dated rule, explain India's reasoning, consider the other side and end with a practical path.
Quick revision
- India and China formed a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership in April 2005 and a Closer Developmental Partnership in September 2014.
- Informal summits took place at Wuhan in April 2018 and Chennai in October 2019.
- In 2017-18, India's trade deficit with China was about US$ 63 billion, with imports of about US$ 76.4 billion.
- India has pressed China on non-tariff barriers, and protocols opened exports of rice, tobacco, fishmeal and chilli meal.
- Press Note 3 of April 2020 put investment from land-border countries on the Government route.
- In March 2026, stakes of up to 10% without control were allowed through the automatic route, with 60-day decisions in key manufacturing sectors.
- On 29 June 2020, 59 mobile apps were blocked under section 69A of the IT Act.
- India rejects the so-called CPEC because some projects lie in Indian territory under Pakistan's illegal occupation.
- Leaders meet at BRICS, the SCO and the G20, including the SCO Summit in Tianjin in 2025.
- Direct flights resumed in October 2025, and India links normal ties to peace on the LAC.